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Does Money Illusion Matter?
By ERNST FEHR AND JEAN-ROBERT TYRAN*
This paper shows that a small amount of individual-level money illusion may cause
considerable aggregate nominal inertia after a negative nominal shock. In addition,
our results indicate that negative and positive nominal shocks have asymmetric
effects because of money illusion. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and
long lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock. (JEL
C92, E32, E52)
Until recently, the notion of money illusion
seemed to be thoroughly discredited in modern
economics. James Tobin (1972) described the
negative attitude of most economic theorists
towards money illusion as follows: “An eco-
nomic theorist can, of course, commit no greater
crime than to assume money illusion” (p. 3). As
a consequence, money illusion has been anath-
ema to the profession for several decades. The
index of the Handbook of Monetary Economics
(Benjamin M. Friedman and Frank M. Hahn,
1990), for example, does not even mention the
term “money illusion.” In principle, money il-
lusion could provide an explanation for the in-
ertia of nominal prices and wages and, thus, for
the nonneutrality of money. The stickiness of
nominal prices and wages seems to be an im-
portant phenomenon (see, e.g., George A.
Akerlof et al., 1996; Ben S. Bernanke and
Kevin Carey, 1996; David Card and Dean
Hyslop, 1997; Shulamit Kahn, 1997; Truman F.
Bewley, 1998; Alan S. Blinder et al., 1998). It
has puzzled economists for decades because it is
quite difficult to explain in an equilibrium
model with maximizing individuals. Instead of
money illusion other factors like informational
frictions (Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 1972), staggering
of contracts (e.g., Stanley Fischer, 1977; John
B. Taylor, 1979), costs of price adjustment (N.
Gregory Mankiw, 1985), and near-rationality
(Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen, 1985) have been
invoked to explain nominal inertia.
In this paper we do not contest the potential
relevance of these explanations. We do, how-
ever, argue that money illusion has prematurely
been dismissed as a potential candidate for the
explanation of sluggish nominal price adjust-
ment. Our argument is based on rigorous exper-
imental evidence from a price-setting game that
isolates money illusion from other potential de-
terminants of nominal inertia. In particular, we
show that after a fully anticipated negative nom-
inal shock, long-lasting nominal inertia pre-
vails, even if informational frictions, costs of
price adjustment and staggering are absent. Our
results indicate that the direct and indirect ef-
fects of money illusion are the major determi-
nants of this long-lasting nominal inertia. We
show, in addition, that money illusion causes
much less nominal inertia after a fully antici-
pated positive nominal shock. This result is
reminiscent of the Keynesian proposition that
downward wage rigidity causes asymmetric re-
sponses to monetary shocks. Yet, since we ob-
tain our result in a price-setting game, the
asymmetric response cannot be directly related
to downward wage rigidity. Our results suggest
that the asymmetry is caused by a particular
form of money illusion arising from people
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taking nominal payoffs as a proxy for real pay-
offs. After a negative money shock, nominal
payoffs decline because prices tend to decline,
while after a positive shock nominal payoffs
increase because prices tend to rise. If these
changes in nominal payoffs are taken as a proxy
for changes in real payoffs there will be more
reluctance to adjust prices to the new equilib-
rium after a negative shock.
Our experiments also allow us to judge the
relative importance of the direct and indirect
effects of money illusion on nominal inertia.
The direct effects of money illusion are defined
as those effects that are the direct result of
individual optimization mistakes. The indirect
effects of money illusion are defined as those
effects that arise because some agents expect
that others are prone to money illusion and, as a
consequence, they behave differently. The dis-
tinction between the direct and the indirect ef-
fects of money illusion is important because
many economists seem to believe that money
illusion is not a widespread phenomenon at the
individual level, i.e., that the direct effects of
money illusion are small. The textbook example
where all nominal prices and nominal incomes
are doubled nicely illustrates this view. It is
hard to believe that many people make an indi-
vidual optimization mistake by choosing a dif-
ferent bundle of goods when prices and incomes
are doubled. Our results clearly show, however,
that it would be misleading to conclude that
money illusion is largely irrelevant because the
direct effects of money illusion are small. In our
experiments the direct effects of money illusion
on nominal inertia after the negative shock are
also rather small but the total effects neverthe-
less are very large. The reason for this finding is
that money illusion renders price expectations
very sticky after the negative shock, which—
under conditions of strategic complementar-
ity—induces agents to choose sticky prices.
This result lends support to theories that stress
that small amounts of individual-level irratio-
nality can have large aggregate effects (Akerlof
and Yellen, 1985; John Haltiwanger and
Michael Waldman, 1985, 1989; Thomas Russell
and Richard Thaler, 1985). It also lends support
to the view of George W. Evans and Garey
Ramey (1992, 1998) that costly expectation for-
mation causes expectations and prices to adjust
only gradually to the rational expectations equi-
librium. Although there are no direct costs of
forming expectations in our experiments, it is
quite likely that the task of forming expectations
involves cognitive costs. Taken together, the
results of our experiments suggest that money
illusion matters, i.e., money illusion should be
considered as a serious candidate in the expla-
nation of nominal inertia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
In Section I we discuss the notion of money
illusion and its potential aggregate implications
in more detail. In Section II we argue that
experimental methods are appropriate for study-
ing whether money illusion matters and we
present our experimental design. In Section III
the experimental results of the design with the
negative nominal shock are presented. Section
IV argues that the nature of money illusion in
our experiment suggests that after a positive
nominal shock there should be less nominal
inertia. This conjecture is tested in a design with
a positive nominal shock. In the final section we
summarize and interpret our main results.
I. Money Illusion at the Individual
and the Aggregate Level
A. Money Illusion at the Individual Level
Wassily Leontief (1936) defined money illu-
sion as a violation of the “homogeneity postu-
late.” This postulate stipulates that demand and
supply functions are homogeneous of degree
zero in all nominal prices which means that they
depend only on relative and not on absolute
prices. Although other authors have used
slightly different definitions, the intuition be-
hind their definitions seems to be rather similar.
This intuition says that if the real incentive
structure, that is, the objective situation, an in-
dividual faces remains unchanged, the real de-
cisions of an illusion-free individual do not
change either. Two crucial assumptions underly
this intuition: First, the objective function of the
individual does not depend on nominal but only
on real magnitudes. Second, people perceive
that purely nominal changes do not affect their
opportunity set. For example, people have to
understand that an equi-proportionate change in
all nominal magnitudes leaves the real con-
straints unaffected. Whether people are, in fact,
able to pierce the veil of money, i.e., whether
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they understand that purely nominal changes
leave their objective circumstances unchanged,
is an empirical question. Irving Fisher (1928),
for example, was convinced that ordinary peo-
ple are, in general, prone to money illusion.
More recently Eldar Shafir et al. (1997) pro-
vided interesting questionnaire evidence indi-
cating that frequently one or both preconditions
for the absence of money illusion are violated.
Their results suggest that the preferences of
many people as well as their perceptions of the
constraints are affected by nominal values.
Moreover, the answers of many people do not
only indicate that they themselves are prone to
money illusion but that they also expect other
people’s behavior to be affected by money
illusion.
Since the absence of money illusion means
that an individual’s preferences, perceptions
and, hence, choices of real magnitudes are not
affected by purely nominal changes, it is natural
to view money illusion as a framing or repre-
sentation effect. From this viewpoint, an indi-
vidual exhibits money illusion if his or her
decisions depend on whether the same environ-
ment is represented in nominal or real terms.
There is a large body of experimental research
that shows that alternative representations of the
same situation may well lead to systematically
different responses (Reinhard Selten and Claus
C. Berg, 1970; Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, 1981). Representation effects seem
to arise because people tend to adopt the par-
ticular frame that is presented and evaluate the
options within this frame. Because some op-
tions loom larger in one representation than in
another, alternative framings of the same op-
tions may provoke different choices.
It is important to note that the nominal rep-
resentation of an economic situation is probably
the natural representation for most people. This
is so because most economic transactions in
people’s lives involve the use of money and,
hence, are framed in nominal terms. Therefore,
it is likely that people often perceive and think
about economic problems in nominal terms
which may induce money illusion. A rather
basic form of money illusion occurs when peo-
ple take nominal values or changes in nominal
values as a proxy for real values or changes in
real values, respectively. Note that this rule of
thumb makes perfect sense in an environment
with a given aggregate price level. However,
this rule is inappropriate in situations where the
aggregate price level is changing. Therefore, the
application of this rule in an environment with
changing aggregate prices constitutes a form of
money illusion.
B. Money Illusion at the Aggregate Level
In the past, economists frequently invoked
the assumption of money illusion to account
for the short-run nonneutrality of money (e.g.,
Fisher, 1928). However, since the success of
the rational expectations revolution, econo-
mists have been extremely reluctant to invoke
money illusion to explain the short-run non-
neutrality of money. A common feature of the
models of New Classical and New Keynesian
macroeconomists is that they exclusively fo-
cus on the equilibrium states of their econo-
mies. In general, they remain silent on how
economic agents move from one equilibrium
to the other. In models that exclusively focus
on equilibrium, the assumption of the absence
of money illusion is very intuitive because it
is difficult to imagine that an illusion could
persist in equilibrium. However, there is a
strong a priori argument that money illusion
is likely to affect the adjustment process of an
economy after a fully anticipated monetary
shock. This argument is based on the simple
fact that in an interactive situation the failure
of some agents to fully adjust to the nominal
shock will, in general, provide incentives for
other agents to not fully adjust to the shock,
either. Thus, there may be a snowball effect
that causes less than full adjustment for a
prolonged period of time.
This can be illustrated in the context of a
monopolistically competitive economy as ana-
lyzed in, for example, Akerlof and Yellen
(1985) or Olivier Jean Blanchard and Nobuhiro
Kiyotaki (1987). To keep the argument simple
we focus solely on the firms’ behavior. The
reduced-form real profit function for firms in
these models can be written as
(1) p i 5 p i ~Pi /P# , M/P# !, i 5 1, ... , n
where pi is firm i’s real profit, Pi is the nominal
price set by firm i, P# is the aggregate price
level, M denotes the supply of money, and n the
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number of firms.1 In these models M/P# is pro-
portional to real aggregate demand. For sim-
plicity, we assume identical firms, the absence
of menu costs and informational frictions, and a
unique and symmetric equilibrium P*i 5 P*j , for
all i, j. In this equilibrium each firm maximizes
real profits by setting P*i 5 P# *. Since (1) is
homogeneous of degree zero in Pi , P# , and M, a
change in M to lM (l Þ 1) leads to post-shock
equilibrium values of lP*i and lP# *.
Suppose now that there is one group of agents
who suffers from money illusion and does,
therefore, not fully adjust their nominal prices
to lP*i. Suppose further that there is a second
group of agents that anticipates the behavior of
the first group. The second group, therefore,
anticipates a change in real aggregate demand
M/P# such that their members, in general, have
an incentive to choose a price that differs from
lP*i , too. Whether the interaction between these
groups causes aggregate nominal inertia de-
pends in an important way on the strategic en-
vironment, that is, whether agents’ actions are
strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1989) have shown
that in the presence of strategic complementar-
ity between agents’ decisions, the existence of a
small group of nonrational subjects can have
large effects on the process of adjustment to
equilibrium. In the above-mentioned model of
monopolistic competition, strategic comple-
mentarity means that firm i’s profit maximizing
nominal price P9i is positively related to the
aggregate price level P# . This means that firms
which believe that, because of money illusion,
the prices of other agents are kept close to the
pre-shock equilibrium have a rational reason to
choose a nominal price that is also close to the
pre-shock equilibrium.
Thus, under strategic complementarity ratio-
nal firms have an incentive to partly imitate the
behavior of the nonrational firms which gives
the latter a disproportionately large impact on
the aggregate price level. In contrast, in the
presence of strategic substitutability, i.e., if P9i is
negatively related to P# , rational firms have an
incentive to partly compensate the behavior of
the nonrational ones so that the latter have a
disproportionately small impact on the aggre-
gate outcome. The results of Haltiwanger and
Waldman (1989) thus suggest that, given stra-
tegic complementarity, the existence of a small
group of subjects that suffer from money illu-
sion may generate substantial nominal inertia.
However, while this is a plausible theoretical
argument, there is, to our knowledge, no empir-
ical evidence for the claim that a small amount
of money illusion may generate substantial
nominal inertia.2
II. An Experimental Approach
to Money Illusion
One way to rigorously examine whether
money illusion matters, is to look for a natural
experiment in which an exogenous and fully
anticipated monetary shock occurs. In order to
unambiguously identify whether the shock is
fully anticipated, the researcher needs to know
individual information sets before the shock. To
judge whether the anticipated shock causes a
disequilibrium and nominal inertia, the re-
searcher has to know the equilibrium values of
nominal prices before and after the shock.
Moreover, to examine whether money illusion
causes nominal inertia, the researcher should
identify two similar natural experiments. In one
experiment the “world” should be framed in
nominal terms while in the other experiment it
should be framed in real terms. In our view, it
seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
meet the above requirements with field data. In
fact, the exogeneity of monetary policy and the
causality between money and output is a matter
of considerable debate (e.g., Christina D.
Romer and David H. Romer, 1989, 1994; Kevin
D. Hoover and Steven J. Perez, 1994; Wilbur
John Coleman, 1996). In addition, full knowl-
edge of the pre- and post-shock equilibrium
1 Equation (1) already incorporates (i) the maximizing
behavior of all households, (ii) the cost-minimizing behav-
ior of all firms for given output and wages levels, (iii) the
equilibrium real wage, and (iv) the equilibrium relation
between real aggregate demand and real money balances.
2 Since strategic complementarity is important for our
argument in favor of the aggregate relevance of (beliefs
about) money illusion, one would like to know to what
extent it does prevail in naturally occurring economies.
Seonghwan Oh and Waldman (1990, 1994), Russell Cooper
and Haltiwanger (1996), and Blinder et al. (1998) provide
evidence in favor of the relevance of strategic complemen-
tarity in real economies.
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values of nominal prices is clearly beyond the
information content of presently available field
data. In reality, almost all business transactions
are shrouded in nominal money, i.e., it is very
difficult to find real-world examples of a real
frame.
In an appropriate laboratory setting, however,
the above-mentioned data requirements can be
met. The techniques of experimental economics
allow the implementation of exogenous and
fully anticipated nominal shocks and the exper-
imenter can exert full control over pre- and
post-shock equilibrium values of nominal
prices. In addition, the experimenter controls
the framing of the situation, e.g., whether sub-
jects receive the payoff information in nominal
or in real terms. These enhanced control oppor-
tunities suggest that laboratory experiments
provide valuable information regarding the im-
pact of money illusion on nominal inertia,
which may complement and help to interpret the
results of studies based on field data (for field
evidence see, e.g., Michael Abbott and Orley
Ashenfelter, 1976; Beth T. Niemi and Cynthia
B. Lloyd, 1981). The use of experimental meth-
ods also distinguishes our examination from the
study of Shafir et al. (1997). While these authors
asked subjects hypothetical questions, we di-
rectly observe the evolution of individual and
aggregate behavior after a nominal shock.
A. General Description of the
Experimental Design
To study the impact of money illusion, we
designed an n-player pricing game with stra-
tegic complementarity and a unique equilib-
rium. The pricing game was divided into a
pre-shock and a post-shock phase. All n
players simultaneously had to determine their
nominal prices in each period of the game.
They were free to change their nominal prices
in each period at no cost. The players interacted
anonymously via computer terminals. Each
treatment condition had 2T periods. During the
first T periods of a session the money supply
was given by M0. Then we implemented a fully
anticipated monetary shock by reducing the
money supply to M1. This shock and the fact
that the post-shock phase again lasted T periods
was common knowledge.
Our major interest concerns subjects’ pricing
behavior in the post-shock phase. The pre-shock
phase serves the purpose to make subjects ac-
quainted with the computer terminal and the
decision environment. In addition, and more
importantly, the pre-shock phase allows us to
see whether subjects reach equilibrium in the
pre-shock phase. After all, one can only argue
that money illusion is a disequilibrating force if
equilibrium has in fact been reached before the
shock.
The real payoff of subject i, pi , is given by
(2) p i 5 p i ~Pi , P# 2i , M! i 5 1, ... , n
where Pi denotes i’s nominal price, P# 2i repre-
sents the average price of the other n 2 1 group
members while M denotes a nominal shock
variable (money supply). The nominal payoff of
subject i is given by P# 2ipi. In total, we have
four treatment conditions and the payoff func-
tions (2) are the same in all conditions. The four
conditions differ along two dimensions (see
Table 1). The first dimension concerns the fram-
ing of the situation, i.e., whether payoffs are
represented in real or in nominal terms. In the
real treatments, denoted by RC and RH, subjects
received the payoff information in real terms
while in the nominal treatments, denoted by NC
and NH, payoffs were represented in nominal
terms. Thus, to compute their real payoffs in the
TABLE 1—TREATMENT CONDITIONS
Payoffs in Real Terms Payoffs in Nominal Terms
Computerized opponents Real treatment with computerized opponents
(RC): 22 groups with 1 human and n 2
1 computerized players in each group
Nominal treatment with computerized
opponents (NC): 24 groups with 1
human and n 2 1 computerized
players in each group
Human opponents Real treatment with human opponents (RH):
10 groups with n human players in each
group
Nominal treatment with human opponents
(NH): 11 groups with n human players
in each group
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nominal treatments subjects had to divide their
nominal payoffs P# 2ipi by P# 2i.
The second dimension concerns the fact
whether our experimental subjects face n 2 1
preprogrammed computerized players or
whether they face n 2 1 other human subjects.
The crucial point here is that in the computer-
ized condition where one human subject faces
n 2 1 preprogrammed computers, the subject is
informed about the aggregate response rule of
the computers in advance. The response rule of
the computers is given by the best replies of the
computers [based on the computers’ payoff
functions (2)]. Therefore, there is no strategic
uncertainty and, hence, no need to form expec-
tations about the behavior of the other players in
this condition. Moreover, since the computers
play best replies, their behavior rules out any
money illusion or any other form of irrational-
ity. In contrast, in the condition with human
opponents each subject faces the task of form-
ing expectations about the other players’ price
choices. This necessarily also involves a guess
about the extent to which other players are
affected by money illusion.
The conditions with computerized players es-
sentially boil down to individual decision-
making experiments in which human subjects
can maximize their money earnings by playing
optimally against the known aggregate best re-
ply of the n 2 1 computerized players. Note
that in the computerized conditions the indirect
effects of money illusion, which operate via the
expectations that other players are affected by
money illusion, can play no role because the
computers play best reply. These conditions,
therefore, allow us to examine to what extent
money illusion has direct effects on nominal
inertia, i.e., to what extent it simply causes
individual optimization mistakes. In the condi-
tions with human opponents the indirect effects
of money illusion can, in addition, also play a
role.
The experimental design in Table 1 allows to
isolate various potentially important determi-
nants of nominal inertia. In the RC, money
illusion is ruled out at the individual and, hence,
also the aggregate level. Therefore, if we ob-
serve in the RC a slow adjustment of the nom-
inal price chosen by the human subject after the
shock, money illusion cannot be the source of
this nominal inertia. Thus, with the help of the
RC we can test the hypothesis whether there are
individual-level irrationalities other than money
illusion.
In the NC, in contrast, money illusion can
affect the behavior of individuals because as a
part of the individual optimization problem hu-
man subjects have to correctly deflate nominal
payoffs at the various (Pi , P# 2i) combinations.
Hence, by comparing the post-shock prices of
human subjects in the RC and the NC we can
observe whether there exists money illusion at
the individual level.
In the RH, as in the RC, individual-level
irrationality other than money illusion can play
a role. However, in the RH the adjustment to the
new post-shock equilibrium is not just an indi-
vidual optimization problem for the human sub-
jects. In the RH, adjustment to the new
equilibrium also involves the solution of a com-
plex coordination problem.3 It cannot be taken
for granted that subjects instantaneously suc-
ceed to act according to the new post-shock
equilibrium. A plausible reason for this is that
the complexity of subjects’ task is greater in the
RH compared to the RC.
The RH and the RC are used to examine
to what extent individual-level irrationalities,
other than money illusion, together with the
coordination problem contribute to nominal in-
ertia. The difference in price adjustment be-
tween the RH and the RC measures the impact
of the coordination problem plus the impact of
the interaction between the coordination prob-
lem and the individual irrationalities that are not
related to money illusion. Interaction effects
occur when these individual irrationalities cause
slow adjustment by some subjects after the
shock which—due to strategic complementar-
ity—induces the other subjects to adjust slowly,
too. A particularly interesting case arises if we
find no nominal inertia in the RC while in the
RH nominal inertia prevails. In this case all of
the nominal inertia in the RH can be attributed
to the coordination problem because individual
3 There is an important literature on coordination prob-
lems in macroeconomic models (see, e.g., Cooper, 1999)
that is based on the existence of multiple equilibria. We use
the term “coordination problem” in a different way because,
even in the case of a unique equilibrium, subjects face a
coordination problem: Nash-equilibrium play presupposes
that subjects have coordinated (equilibrium) expectations.
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irrationalities (other than money illusion) are
absent.
In the NH, subjects face the same coordina-
tion problem as in the RH. We are, however,
particularly interested in the impact of adding
the nominal frame to this coordination problem,
i.e., in a comparison of the NH and the RH. This
comparison allows us to isolate the total effects
of money illusion in an environment where sub-
jects face a coordination problem. The total
effects of money illusion in this environment
consist of the direct effects of individual-level
money illusion as exhibited in the NC plus the
indirect “multiplier” effects of individual-level
illusion. These “multiplier” effects may arise
because in our setting with human opponents,
subjects with money illusion can also affect the
expectations and thus the behavior of the sub-
jects without money illusion. If, for example,
some subjects exhibit money illusion by taking
(variations in) the nominal payoff as a proxy for
(variations in) the real payoff, adjustment to
equilibrium in the NH may be slower than in the
RH. The reason is that after a negative shock,
adjustment requires a decrease in nominal prices.
By definition, a decrease in nominal prices is
associated with a decrease in nominal payoff
numbers in the NH. Therefore, subjects who
exhibit the above form of money illusion mis-
takenly believe that real payoffs decrease with
lower nominal prices. Thus, they prefer to stay
at higher nominal prices, which may have a
direct adjustment-reducing effect. Moreover, if
some subjects believe that others suffer from
this form of money illusion, they have an in-
centive to slow down adjustment, too. In the
RH, in contrast, this effect cannot occur because
payoffs are represented in real terms. In the RH,
it is, therefore, completely transparent that gen-
eral price reductions are not associated with
lower real payoffs.
If the deviation from the post-shock equilib-
rium is larger and lasts longer in the NH com-
pared to the RH, we have support for the
hypothesis that money illusion contributes to
nominal inertia. If, in addition, the price expec-
tations are more sticky in the NH than in the RH
we have an indication for indirect effects be-
cause the indirect effects become effective via
sticky expectations. However, our design also
enables us to isolate the indirect effects of
money illusion at the behavioral level. The dif-
ference in the deviations of the post-shock av-
erage prices from equilibrium between the NC
and the RC, DPNC 2 DPRC, measures the
aggregate impact of individual-level money il-
lusion on nominal inertia. Note that DPNC 2
DPRC 5 PNC 2 PRC because the equilibrium
price is identical across conditions. The differ-
ence between the NH and the RH, DPNH 2
DPRH 5 PNH 2 PRH, measures the total ef-
fects of money illusion which consist of the
individual-level effects plus the indirect effects.
Thus, if there are no indirect effects of money
illusion the total effects must be equal to the
individual-level effects: PNH 2 PRH 5 PNC 2
PRC. If there are, however, indirect effects we
should observe that PNH 2 PRH . PNC 2
PRC.4
B. General Properties of the Payoff Functions
Before we proceed to the specific numerical
parameters of our experiment, it is useful to
provide a general description of the payoff func-
tions (2). They have the following properties:
(i) They are homogeneous of degree zero in Pi ,
P# 2i , and M.
(ii) The best reply is (weakly) increasing in P# 2i.
In addition, our functional specification5 of
equation (2) implies that the equilibrium
(iii) is unique for every M,
(iv) is the only Pareto-efficient point in payoff
space, and
(v) can be found by iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies.
4 Note also that if there are no individual irrationalities
other than money illusion, DPRC 5 0, and the condition
for the existence of indirect effects, DPNH 2 DPRH .
DPNC 2 DPRC, can then be written as DPNH . DPRH 1
DPNC. This means that if the deviation from equilibrium
in the NH condition is larger than the summed devia-
tions in the RH and the NC condition, indirect effects
prevail.
5 The functional form is presented in the Appendix.
Readers who are interested in the full set of instructions
should consult the Appendix in Fehr and Tyran (2000),
which can be downloaded from http://www.iew.unizh.ch/
wp/iewwp045.pdf. The instructions are also available from
the authors upon request.
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Note that the real payoff pi does not depend on
the average price P# of all group members but on
P# 2i. This feature makes it particularly easy to
play a best reply for a given expectation about
the other players’ average price. If we made pi
dependent on P# , so that Pi affects P# , it would
have been much more difficult for i to compute
the best reply (see also below). It is also worth-
while to point out that the nominal payoff for
each subject i is given by P# 2ipi and not by
P# pi. This makes the computation of the real
payoffs from a given nominal payoff much eas-
ier because the deflator is independent of one’s
own price choice.
Properties (i) and (iii) above were imple-
mented because our analysis focuses on the
impact of money illusion on the adjustment
process of an economy with a unique money-
neutral equilibrium P*i , i 5 1, ... , n. To see
that properties (i) and (iii) imply neutrality, note
that a change in M from M0 to lM0 leaves real pay-
offs unaffected if prices change to lPi and
lP# 2i. Moreover, if P9i , i 5 1, ... , n, is a best
reply to P# 2i at M0, lP9i also is a best reply
to lP# 2i at lM0. Thus, lP*i for all i is the
post-shock equilibrium.
Property (ii) captures strategic complementa-
rity and was implemented for the reasons given
in Section I, subsection B. In our pilot experi-
ments we initially implemented a price-setting
game with monopolistic competition. However,
it turned out that subjects quickly realized that
under monopolistic competition cooperative
gains can be achieved by out-of-equilibrium
behavior. Therefore, both in the nominal as well
as in the real frame, subjects systematically
tried to achieve real payoff gains through out-
of-equilibrium behavior. Only towards the end
of each phase these attempts vanished. Thus, in
the pre- as well as in the post-shock phase of our
pilot experiments, adjustment towards equilib-
rium was strongly retarded by attempts to co-
operate. To remove this confound with the other
sources of nominal inertia we chose payoff
functions that ensured that the equilibrium was
the unique Pareto-efficient point in the whole
payoff space [property (iv)].
Finally, property (v) means that there is a
method for finding the equilibrium that works
exactly in the same way in the real as well as in
the nominal frame. Note that the framing of
payoffs has no impact at all on whether a par-
ticular strategy is (weakly) dominated. In the
real frame a (weakly) dominated strategy Pi has
(weakly) smaller real payoff numbers at any
level of P# 2i. In the nominal frame a (weakly)
dominated strategy Pi has (weakly) smaller
nominal payoff numbers at any level of P# 2i.
Thus, to eliminate (weakly) dominated strate-
gies in either frame, subjects only need to elim-
inate those strategies that have (weakly) smaller
(real or nominal) payoff numbers at any given
level of P# 2i. Since, in the condition with human
opponents, the best-reply function and, hence,
the number of (weakly) dominated strategies is
exactly the same under the real and the nominal
frame, there is, in the absence of money illu-
sion, no reason why adjustment should differ
across the RH and the NH.
C. Experimental Procedures and Parameters
All major experimental parameters are sum-
marized in Table 2. The experiment was con-
ducted in a computerized laboratory with a
group size of n 5 4. The group composition did
not change throughout the whole experiment,
i.e., for 2T periods. In each group there were
two types of subjects: Subjects of type x and
subjects of type y. Payoff functions differed
among the types. This difference implied that
x-types had to choose a relatively low price in
equilibrium while y-types had to choose a rel-
atively high price (see Table 2 for details).
There is no particular reason for our choice of
the group size because there are no strong con-
jectures about the net effects of a different
group size. On the one hand, a larger group size
enhances the chances that there are individuals
with money illusion in a group. On the other
hand, the relative impact of an individual on
average prices becomes smaller. With regard to
the heterogeneity of the players’ payoff func-
tions, the case of four different payoff functions
would be the most realistic but also the most
complicated case. Therefore, we went for an
intermediate solution with only two types of
players.6
In the pre-shock phase of each treatment the
6 The payoff functions of the two types were the same up
to a parallel shift. Except for P*k and P# *k all parameters of the
payoff function specified in the Appendix are the same for
both types.
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money supply was given by M0 5 42 while in
the post-shock phase it was given by M1 5
M0/3 5 14. In the pre-shock equilibrium the
average price over all n group members is given
by P# *0 5 18 while in the post-shock equilib-
rium it is P# *1 5 6. In the treatments with human
opponents both the pre- and the post-shock
phase consists of T 5 20 periods while in the
treatments with computerized opponents T 5
10. The reason for this difference was that we
expected that adjustment would take longer in
the presence of a coordination problem. For the
purpose of comparing post-shock nominal iner-
tia across treatments it is crucial that the re-
quired price adjustment, i.e., the difference
between actual nominal prices in the final pre-
shock period and the new post-shock equilib-
rium price, is roughly the same. To ensure
comparable adjustment requirements across
treatments we gave players more time to reach
the equilibrium in the treatments with a coordi-
nation problem.
In each decision period subjects had to
choose an integer Pi [ {1, 2, ... , 30}. In
addition, they had to provide an expectation
about P# 2i which we denote by P# 2ie . Finally,
subjects indicated their confidence about their
expectation P# 2ie by choosing an integer from 1
to 6 where 1 indicated that the subject is “not at
all confident” while 6 indicated that he or she is
“absolutely confident.”7 This measure of confi-
dence can be interpreted as an indicator of sub-
jects’ perceived uncertainty about the other
players’ choices. Note that this uncertainty is an
inevitable component of the coordination prob-
lem that subjects face in the condition with
human opponents. At the end of each period
each subject was informed about the actual re-
alization of P# 2i and the actual real payoff pi on
a so-called outcome screen. In addition, the
outcome screen provided information about the
subject’s past choices of Pi , past realizations of
P# 2i , and past real payoffs pi.
Subjects received the payoff information in
matrix form.8 The payoff matrix shows the real
and the nominal payoff, respectively, for each
7 The detailed meaning attached to the numbers is: 1 5
not at all confident; 2 5 not much confidence; 3 5 not quite
confident; 4 5 quite confident; 5 5 very confident; 6 5
absolutely confident.
8 Appendix C of Fehr and Tyran (2000) contains the
payoff matrices of x- and y-types for all treatment condi-
tions. See also footnote 5.
TABLE 2—EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Panel A: All Periods
Representation of payoffs in the nominal frame P# 2ipi
Representation of payoffs in the real frame pi
Group size n 5 4
Information feedback in period t P# 2i , pi
Real equilibrium payoff 40
Choice variable Pi [ {1, 2, ... , 30}
Length of pre- and post-shock phase in treatment with computerized opponents T 5 10
Length of pre- and post-shock phase in treatment with human opponents T 5 20
Panel B: Pre-Shock Values
Money supply M0 42
Average equilibrium price P# * and average equilibrium expectation for the whole group 18
Equilibrium price for type x 9
Equilibrium expectation P# 2ie for type x 21
Equilibrium price for type y 27
Equilibrium expectation P# 2ie for type y 15
Panel C: Post-Shock Values
Money supply M1 14
Average equilibrium price P# * and average equilibrium expectation for the whole group 6
Equilibrium price for type x 3
Equilibrium expectation P# 2ie for type x 7
Equilibrium price for type y 9
Equilibrium expectation P# 2ie for type y 5
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feasible integer combination of (Pi , P# 2i). To
inform subjects about the payoffs of the other
type, each subject also received the payoff ma-
trix of the other type. This information condi-
tion was common knowledge. The presentation
of payoffs in the form of a matrix made it
particularly easy to find the best reply for any
given P# 2i: The subject just had to look for the
highest real or nominal payoff in the column
associated with P# 2i.9 In fact, one of the first
things most subjects did after we distributed the
instructions was to mark the best replies in the
payoff tables.
After subjects had read the instructions, but
before the start of the experiment, each subject
had to solve a series of exercises (see the Appen-
dix in Fehr and Tyran, 2000). These exercises
involved the computation of their own payoff and
the payoff of their opponents for given hypothet-
ical strategy profiles. In the nominal treatments, in
particular, subjects had to compute the real pay-
offs from their nominal payoff tables for given
hypothetical strategy profiles. The subjects knew
that we did not start the experiment until every
participant in a session had solved all exercises
successfully. All subjects were in fact able to solve
the exercises. By this training procedure we
wanted to rule out that subjects do not know how
to properly deflate nominal values. It is quite
likely that this procedure diminished the amount
of individual-level money illusion in our experi-
ment. It was motivated by the question whether a
small amount of individual-level money illusion
will cause long-lasting nominal inertia in the NH
because of the indirect effects of money illusion.
Obviously, the case for the relevance of money
illusion is stronger if we observe large indirect
effects.
In the treatments with computerized oppo-
nents, subjects received the same instructions
and payoff tables as in the treatments with hu-
man opponents. In addition, subjects were in-
formed that the decisions of the other three
players in the group would be made by prepro-
grammed computers. Subjects received an in-
formation sheet that informed them about the
P# 2i response of the three computers to each
price choice Pi [ {1, 2, ... , 30}. Fifty percent
of the human subjects in these conditions were
endowed with the payoff function of an
x-player, the other 50 percent had the payoff
function of a y-player.
At the end of the final pre-shock period the
nominal shock was implemented in the follow-
ing way: Subjects were publicly informed that
x- and y-types received new payoff tables.
These tables were based on M1 5 M0/3. Again
each type received the payoff table for his own
and the other type. Subjects kept the pre-shock
tables and were encouraged to compare the pre-
and post-shock tables. They were told that, ex-
cept for payoff tables, everything else would
remain unchanged. They were given enough
time to study the new payoff tables and to
choose Pi for the first post-shock period.10 This
procedure ensured that in the first post-shock
period subjects faced an exogenous and fully
anticipated negative nominal shock. At the be-
ginning of this period it was also common
knowledge that the experiment would last for
another T periods.
Before we proceed to the experimental re-
sults, it needs to be emphasized that in a given
phase the number of dominated price choices is
identical across all treatments. It is, however,
not identical between the pre- and the post-
shock phase. Since the money supply is lower in
the post-shock phase the number of dominated
strategies is also lower in this phase. Note that
the smaller number of dominated strategies in the
post-shock phase is an inevitable result of the
fact that the money supply is reduced while the
nominal strategy space and the nominal ac-
counting unit is kept constant.11 Due to the
9 If a subject is uncertain about the true value of P# 2i , the
calculation of the best reply requires, of course, to take into
account the subjective distribution of P# 2i and not only
the expectation of P# 2i. However, for simplicity, in the
following we will use the term “best reply” in the sense of
a best reply to the expectation of P# 2i.
10 Subjects were told that they had ten minutes to study
the new payoff tables and, in addition, three minutes to
make a decision for the first post-shock period. Yet, almost
all subjects made their decision well before the 13 minutes
had elapsed. In the subsequent periods subjects also rarely
exhausted their time limits.
11 A change in the nominal price in the post-shock phase
(i.e., at M0/3) by one unit has the same real effects as a
change in the nominal price by three units in the pre-shock
phase (i.e., at M0). This means that if a nominal price is
strictly dominated in the post-shock phase there will, in
general, be three nominal prices that are strictly dominated
in the pre-shock phase.
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differences in the number of dominated strat-
egies a comparison of the adjustment speed
across phases must take this difference into
account. The higher number of dominated
strategies in the pre-shock phase means, in
particular, that the indirect effects of money
illusion are likely to be smaller in this phase.
This is so because, if a strategy is dominated,
it is optimal to not play this strategy irrespec-
tive of the expectations about other players’
behavior. Thus, expectations about other
players’ money illusion necessarily have less
impact and, as a consequence, one would
expect a quicker adjustment towards equilib-
rium in the pre-shock phase. Note also that
the different number of dominated strategies
across phases is not a problem for the main
purpose of our research. We are not interested
in comparing adjustment speed across phases
but across treatments in the post-shock phase.
For our purposes the crucial point is that in
the post-shock phase the number of domi-
nated strategies is identical across treatments
because the only difference in the payoff ta-
bles concerns the framing of the payoffs.
III. Results
In total, 130 subjects participated in the
experiments described in Table 1.12 Twenty-
two subjects participated in the real treatment
with computerized opponents (RC) and 24
subjects in the nominal treatment with com-
puterized opponents (NC). Eleven groups of
four human subjects participated in the nom-
inal treatment with human opponents (NH)
and ten groups in the real treatment with
human opponents (RH). No subject partici-
pated in more than one treatment. Subjects
were undergraduate students from different
disciplines at the University of Zurich, Swit-
zerland. They were paid a show-up fee of
CHF 15 (approx. $12 at that time) and their
total earnings from the experiment were on
average CHF 35 (approx. $28) (including the
show-up fee). On average, an experimental
session lasted 90 minutes.
A. Nominal Price Adjustment as an
Individual Optimization Problem
In this section, we address the question
whether individual-level money illusion and
other individual-level irrationality contribute to
nominal inertia. Therefore, our discussion is
constrained to the RC and the NC, where ad-
justment to the post-shock equilibrium is a pure
individual optimization problem. Our first main
result is that in the RC all subjects instanta-
neously adjust to the new post-shock equilib-
rium, i.e., nominal inertia is completely absent.
Support for this claim is provided by column 1
of Table 3 and by Figure 1. Both the table and
the figure show the pre- and post-shock path of
the average price of all human subjects in the
RC. What is remarkable here is that, except for
a few periods, the average price is exactly equal
to the equilibrium price of P# *0 5 18 in the pre-
and P# *1 5 6 in the post-shock period. More-
over, it is not just the average that coincides
with equilibrium. In most periods literally all
subjects play the equilibrium. This result con-
trasts with what we observe in the nominal
frame. In the NC there is a small amount of
nominal inertia since some subjects do not fully
adjust prices to the new post-shock equilibrium.
This claim is supported by Table 3 (column 2)
and Figure 1. Both the table and the figure show
that the evolution of average prices is, in gen-
eral, more volatile relative to the RC. This sug-
gests that at least some subjects in the NC have
problems in finding the optimal solution to their
maximization problem. Moreover, while in the
RC all subjects instantaneously adjust their
prices fully to the post-shock equilibrium, in the
NC only 80 percent of the subjects do so. The
rest of the subjects choose prices above the
equilibrium so that in the first post-shock period
the average price is by 2.1 units too high.
Throughout the whole post-shock phase the NC
most of the time is close but never exactly in
equilibrium which contrasts again with the RC
where after the second post-shock period all
subjects are exactly in equilibrium almost all of
the time.
These differences in post-shock adjustment
also give rise to differences in the real income
losses across RC and NC. Nominal inertia in the
NC causes small but nonnegligible real income
losses in the post-shock phase. In contrast, in
12 In follow-up experiments with a positive money
shock, described in detail in Section IV, another 96 subjects
participated.
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the RC there are no or only extremely small real
incomes losses in the post-shock phase. To ver-
ify this claim we calculate by how much actual
real income of player i, pi , falls short of real
income in equilibrium p*. For this purpose we
have computed «it [ (p* 2 pit)/p* for all
players in each period t. «it is a measure of the
income loss relative to the equilibrium payoff as
a percentage of the equilibrium payoff. Since
the equilibrium is efficient it is also a measure
of the efficiency loss. Columns 5 and 6 of Table
3 present the evolution of the average value of
«it over all players in the RC and in the NC. The
two columns indicate that after the shock the
average efficiency loss is most of the time zero
in the RC and always lower than in the NC.
Taken together, the results of the treatments
with computerized opponents indicate that there
TABLE 3—EVOLUTION OF PRICES AND EFFICIENCY LOSSES OVER TIME
Period





















220 17.6 18.5 14.4 19.0
219 18.2 19.3 21.5 14.6
218 17.8 19.1 14.1 10.2
217 17.7 19.4 9.5 11.7
216 17.9 19.2 8.8 6.8
215 18.3 19.1 10.8 13.2
214 17.6 18.2 8.0 9.9
213 17.9 18.6 8.2 4.2
212 17.9 18.7 6.3 3.1
211 17.6 18.3 5.5 7.5
210 17.9 15.2 17.8 18.4 1.0 16.4 9.4 3.4
29 18.1 17.0 17.5 18.2 0.5 12.6 3.6 1.6
28 17.8 17.2 17.6 19.0 1.6 9.0 3.3 6.0
27 18.0 18.0 17.7 18.3 0.5 3.0 2.4 1.8
26 17.6 17.2 17.6 18.2 2.4 10.4 10.9 1.3
25 18.0 17.7 18.1 18.3 0.3 5.4 7.0 2.7
24 18.0 18.1 18.1 18.4 0.0 3.5 7.3 2.5
23 17.8 16.1 17.6 18.6 1.3 12.6 3.7 2.8
22 18.4 18.3 17.9 18.2 2.3 1.9 2.2 0.7
21 18.0 17.0 18.0 18.2 0.0 5.3 0.9 0.9
1 6.0 8.1 9.1 13.1 0.0 10.4 51.8 65.1
2 7.0 7.4 7.7 12.9 3.6 8.2 20.0 47.5
3 6.0 6.8 7.4 11.4 0.0 4.4 15.0 34.8
4 6.0 6.4 6.9 10.4 0.6 6.5 9.1 27.4
5 6.0 6.9 7.0 9.9 0.0 8.0 14.8 17.4
6 6.0 6.8 6.6 10.2 0.0 15.6 7.7 15.9
7 6.0 7.5 6.3 9.7 0.0 9.3 4.5 16.4
8 6.0 6.8 6.4 9.1 0.0 15.5 4.6 10.7
9 6.0 6.5 6.3 8.7 0.0 4.3 3.8 9.5
10 5.9 6.5 6.8 8.6 1.6 3.8 11.0 13.8
11 6.1 8.1 4.6 8.2
12 6.2 7.6 3.3 6.4
13 6.2 7.2 2.1 6.2
14 6.2 6.9 2.8 4.6
15 6.1 6.7 2.6 2.6
16 6.1 7.3 2.1 9.6
17 6.0 6.8 0.9 5.2
18 6.1 7.2 1.8 14.2
19 6.1 7.5 1.4 12.5
20 6.2 7.0 3.0 2.4
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is a small amount of money illusion at the
individual level but beyond that there is no
individual irrationality. The small amount of
individual-level money illusion is suggested by
the small price differences between the NC and
the RC after the shock. The absence of other
forms of individual irrationality is suggested by
the perfect adjustment to the shock and the
generally high incidence of equilibrium play in
the RC.
B. Nominal Price Adjustment as a
Coordination Problem
The fact that in the RC the adjustment to the
post-shock equilibrium is perfect makes the in-
terpretation of the deviation of prices from the
post-shock equilibrium in the RH particularly
easy. It means that the whole deviation is due to
the fact that subjects in the RH face a relatively
complex coordination problem. The major facts
about price adjustment in the RH are displayed
in Table 3 and Figure 1. Column 3 of Table 3
shows that in the first post-shock period average
prices in the RH are 3.1 units above the average
equilibrium price of P# *1 5 6. This deviation
quickly decreases to 1.4 units in period 3 and
after period 4 the deviation is never larger than
one unit. This pattern of average behavior is not
an artifact of aggregation but is also revealed at
the level of individual choices. In the final pre-
shock period 93 percent of the subjects in the
RH play exactly their equilibrium strategies. In
the first post-shock period only 35 percent of the
subjects play the new equilibrium and 23 per-
cent of the subjects are only one or two price
units above the equilibrium. The other 42 per-
cent are more than two units above the equilib-
rium. Yet, after only three periods the
distribution of individual price choices has
moved much closer to the equilibrium. In period
4, 45 percent of all subjects play exactly the
equilibrium, 48 percent are one or two units
above and only 7 percent are more than two units
above the equilibrium. This post-shock evolu-
tion of prices indicates that the coordination
FIGURE 1. EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE PRICES
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problem initially causes considerable nominal
inertia but that after a few periods this effect is
rather small because prices are again close to
the equilibrium.
Our description of the pattern of nominal
inertia in the RH is also supported by formal
statistical tests. To check how long average
group prices in the RH and the NH deviate
significantly from the equilibrium we ran the
following regression for the post-shock phase:
(3) P# it 2 P# *1 5 O
t 5 1
19
a t dt 1 O
t 5 1
20
b t ~1 2 dt !
where P# it denotes the average price of group i
in period t. dt 5 1 if the price observation in
period t comes from the RH. The coefficients at
measure the deviation from equilibrium in the
RH while the coefficients bt measure the devi-
ation in the NH.13 The results of regression (3)
are summarized in Table 4. The table shows
that, at the 5-percent level, average prices in the
RH deviate significantly from the equilibrium
for two periods. Yet, from period 3 onwards, the
hypothesis that average prices are in equilib-
rium can no longer be rejected.14
To what extent is nominal inertia in the RH
associated with real income losses? Column 7
of Table 3 indicates that in the first post-shock
period the real income loss resulting from dis-
equilibrium is quite considerable (52 percent).
Yet, due to the relatively quick adjustment of
nominal prices after this period, the real income
loss declines substantially and after the fifth
post-shock period it is—except for period 10—
always below 10 percent. In the final periods the
real income loss is always rather small which
reflects the high incidence of equilibrium play.
The key difference between the RC and the
RH is the presence of a relatively complex
coordination problem in the RH. If subjects
perceive coordination as a difficult problem this
should be reflected in subjects’ confidence in
P# 2ie . In the first few pre-shock periods, sub-jects’ average confidence is at a level of 4 which
means that they are, on average “quite confi-
dent.” The high frequency of equilibrium play
before the shock then causes a general increase
in the confidence level. In the last five pre-shock
periods, subjects exhibit, on average, a confi-
dence level between 5 and 5.5. This means that
most subjects are “very confident” (5 level 5)
or even “absolutely confident” (5 level 6) that
they have correct expectations. The anticipated
negative money shock causes, however, a con-
siderable decrease in subjects’ confidence. In
the first post-shock period, subjects are on av-
erage “not quite confident” (level 3) or “quite
confident” (level 4) that their expectations will
be correct. It takes about eight periods until
pre-shock confidence levels are again estab-
lished. This indicates that the money shock in-
deed causes a considerable coordination
problem for the subjects.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that
13 To prevent linear dependence among the set of regres-
sors, we included no dummy variable for period 20 of
the RH.
14 We also examined the null hypothesis that prices in
the RH differ from prices in the RC by means of nonpara-
metric tests with individual data. The null hypothesis of
equal price distributions and of equal average prices can be
rejected for the first four post-shock periods at the 10-
percent level (Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test and Mann-
Whitney Test).
TABLE 4—DEVIATION FROM POST-SHOCK EQUILIBRIUM IN





























Notes: P# it 2 P# *1 5 ¥t 5 119 atdt 1 ¥t 5 120 bt(1 2 dt).
dt 5 1 if price observation in period t is from RH.
***Denotes significance at the 1-percent level.
**Denotes significance at the 5-percent level.
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the introduction of a coordination problem in
the real treatment causes initially a nonnegli-
gible amount of nominal inertia that is associ-
ated with considerable real effects. Yet, nominal
inertia vanishes relatively quickly so that al-
ready after a few periods prices are quite close
to the equilibrium.
C. Coordination in the Presence
of Money Illusion
Nominal inertia in the RH has nothing to do
with money illusion but is caused by the prob-
lem to coordinate expectations and actions on
the new equilibrium. From the comparison be-
tween the RC and the NC we already know that
individual-level money illusion has a small pos-
itive effect on nominal inertia. In the NH a
small amount of individual-level money illusion
may, however, cause important indirect effects.
These indirect effects can arise because the
presence of individual-level money illusion is
likely to affect subjects’ expectations, which in
turn affect their behavior. If money illusion
indeed causes such indirect effects we should
observe that the introduction of the nominal
frame has a larger effect in the setting with
human players than in the setting with comput-
erized players. We should, in addition, also ob-
serve that in the setting with human players the
nominal frame gives rise to an increase in the
stickiness of subjects’ price expectations.
Figure 1 and Table 3 (columns 3 and 4)
provide the relevant information regarding the
impact of the nominal frame. They show that
nominal prices are indeed much stickier in the
NH compared to the RH. In the final pre-shock
period the overwhelming majority of the sub-
jects play exactly the equilibrium both in the RH
(93 percent) and the NH (80 percent). There-
fore, average prices are very close to the
pre-shock equilibrium P# *0 5 18. In the first
post-shock period, however, only 11.5 percent
of all subjects in the NH play exactly the equi-
librium and 73 percent of the subjects are three
or more price units above the equilibrium. In
contrast, in the RH, 35 percent play exactly the
equilibrium and, in addition, 23 percent are only
two or less price units above the new equilib-
rium. These treatment differences in individual
adjustment behavior also give rise to large dif-
ferences in the average price level. In the first
post-shock period the average price in the NH is
7.1 units above the equilibrium while in the RH
the deviation is only 3.1 units (see Table 3). It
takes eight periods in the NH until the deviation
of average prices from equilibrium decreases to
3.1 units. These large differences in price ad-
justment speed are also confirmed by formal
statistical tests. Table 4 reveals that in the NH
the hypothesis of equilibrium play can be re-
jected at the 5-percent level for the first 12
post-shock periods while in the RH it can only
be rejected for two periods. Similar results
emerge when we examine the null hypothesis of
equal average prices in the NH and the RH by
means of a nonparametric Mann-Whitney Test
with individual data. For the first nine post-
shock periods the null hypothesis can be re-
jected already at the 2-percent level. For the
next three post-shock periods it can be rejected
at the 10-percent level.
To what extent is nominal inertia in the NH
associated with real income losses? Column 8 of
Table 3 indicates that shortly before the shock,
subjects in the NH achieve almost full efficiency.
The monetary shock leads, however, to a substan-
tial real income loss. In the first period after the
shock the average income loss is 65 percent and
during the first ten post-shock periods the loss is
never below 9.5 percent. Note also that throughout
the whole post-shock period the income loss is in
general much higher in the NH than in the RH
which is a consequence of the much stickier prices
in the NH. For example, in the first ten post-shock
periods of the NH, the aggregate real income loss
is roughly twice as large as the loss in the RH. In
total, groups in the NH lose 26 percent of the
potential payoff in the first ten post-shock periods.
In the RH, the respective losses are slightly less
than 14 percent. Thus, the evidence clearly indi-
cates two results: (i) In the setting with human
players the introduction of a nominal frame has
large and long-lasting effects on price stickiness.
(ii) This increase in price stickiness is associated
with a considerable increase in the real income
loss caused by the anticipated money shock.
From Figure 1 and Table 3 we also can infer
that the nominal frame causes much stickier prices
when money illusion can have indirect effects.
Throughout the first ten post-shock periods the
adjustment difference in average prices between
the NH and the RH, DPNH 2 DPRH 5 PNH 2
PRH, is between two and 13 times larger than the
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adjustment difference between the NC and the
RC, DPNC 2 DPRC 5 PNC 2 PRC. It is, for
example, easy to infer from Table 3 that, in the
second post-shock period, the adjustment differ-
ence between the NH and the RH is 12.9 2 7.7 5
5.2 price units, while the difference between the
NC and the RC is only 7.4 2 7.0 5 0.4 units.
Hence, in this period the impact of the nominal
frame is 13 times larger in the setting with human
players compared to the setting with computerized
players. In the tenth post-shock period the adjust-
ment difference is still 1.8 units in the setting with
human players and only 0.6 units in the setting
with computerized players. To substantiate the
indirect effects of money illusion we also con-
ducted period-wise t-tests for the null hypothesis
that the adjustment difference between the NH
and the RH is bigger than between the NC and the
RC. In five of the first ten post-shock periods the
difference between the NH and the RH is signif-
icantly larger at the 5-percent level. In view of the
considerable variance across the four conditions
this is quite remarkable.15 Thus, the implementa-
tion of the nominal frame has a much larger im-
pact in the setting where money illusion can also
have indirect effects.
If money illusion has indirect effects we
should also observe that expectations are stick-
ier in the NH compared to the RH. Figure
2 shows the evolution of the average price ex-
pectations over time in both treatments. The
figure shows that in the last few pre-shock pe-
riods, expectations are in equilibrium in both
treatments. In the post-shock phase there are,
however, striking differences. While expecta-
tions are very sticky in the NH they are far less
sticky in the RH. To provide statistical evidence
for this, we ran the same regression as in Table
4 with expectations data. It turns out that, in the
NH, expectations differ significantly from the
equilibrium (at p , 0.05) for 13 periods while
in the RH they differ only for three periods.
Thus, there can be little doubt that the nominal
frame causes a large increase in the stickiness of
price expectations. The next question then is, to
what extent this difference in expectations
causes differences in subjects’ price choices. Or
put differently, to what extent did subjects play
a best reply to their expectations. The vast ma-
jority of subjects in both treatments indeed
played best replies to P# 2ie . During the first ten
post-shock periods 84 percent of the subjects in
the RH choose exactly the payoff-maximizing
price in response to P# 2ie and the rest of the
subjects chooses prices that were close to the
best reply. In the NH there are slightly fewer
subjects (80 percent) who chose exact best re-
plies during the first ten post-shock periods.
Yet, as in the RH, the deviations from the exact
best reply were in general very small. The fact
that most subjects responded to P# 2ie with a
payoff-maximizing price choice suggests that
the greater stickiness of the expectations in the
NH also caused a greater stickiness of actual
prices in the NH.
IV. Nominal Inertia after
a Positive Money Shock
A. The Relevance of a Positive Money Shock
Our results so far indicate that the direct
effects of individual-level money illusion are
relatively small. The introduction of the nomi-
nal frame in the setting with computerized play-
ers leads only to a small increase in nominal
inertia. Nominal inertia is much more pro-
nounced, however, when money illusion can
also affect players’ expectations and can, thus,
also have indirect effects. In the NH, subjects’
expectations are much stickier and, as a conse-
quence, prices are much stickier. This raises the
question of why expectations are so sticky in
the NH compared to the RH. We believe that
the answer to this question can be found in the
existence of subjects who take nominal payoffs
as a proxy for real payoffs. Subjects who apply
this rule of thumb mistakenly believe that if all
players choose relatively high prices, all will
reap high real payoffs because they all reap high
nominal payoffs. They mistakenly believe that
there are real gains from jointly setting high
prices. Such subjects will, therefore, be reluc-
tant to cut their nominal prices after the negative
money shock in the NH. Moreover, if the pres-
ence of subjects who are reluctant to cut prices
is anticipated by other subjects, others will be
induced to cut their price insufficiently also.
It is important to note that the above rule of
15 There are two subjects in the NC condition who could
well be classified as outliers. If we run the tests without
these two subjects the indirect effects are highly significant
in the first nine post-shock periods.
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thumb cannot become effective in the RH. In
the RH the numbers in the payoff tables repre-
sent real payoffs which makes it completely
transparent that at high nominal prices real pay-
offs are not generally higher. This means that
the presence of subjects who take nominal pay-
offs as a proxy for real payoffs causes no reluc-
tance to cut nominal prices after the negative
shock in the RH. These differences between the
NH and the RH in the reluctance to cut nominal
prices also provide a rationale for the much
stickier price expectations in the NH.
Yet, if the above explanation for the stickier
expectations in the NH is correct, we should
also observe that after a positive money shock,
prices and expectations adjust more quickly to
the equilibrium than after a negative shock. This
is so because after a positive shock, adjustment
towards equilibrium means adjustment towards
higher prices and, hence, higher nominal pay-
offs. A quicker adjustment after a positive
shock, however, does not mean that money il-
lusion is absent when a positive shock occurs. It
only means that money illusion has a different
impact after a positive shock compared to a
negative shock. After a negative shock the rule
of thumb mentioned above causes a reluctance
to adjust prices (downwards) while after a pos-
itive shock it does not cause a reluctance to
adjust prices (upwards). Note further that while
the rule of thumb implies a quicker adjustment
to equilibrium after a positive shock in the NH,
the adjustment speed in the RH should not differ
across positive and negative shocks. The reason
is that the rule of thumb cannot become opera-
tive in the RH.
To test these implications of our explanation
for the much stickier expectations in the NH we
conducted additional experiments with a posi-
tive money shock. Forty-eight subjects (12
groups) participated in the RH and another 48
subjects (12 groups) participated in the NH with
the positive money shock. The easiest way to
implement a positive shock would be a reversal
in the sequence of the money supply in our
previous design. Unfortunately, this approach is
FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION OF AVERAGE EXPECTATIONS
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not reasonable because the number of domi-
nated strategies is much larger in the pre-shock
phase than in the post-shock phase. Therefore,
the indirect effects of money illusion can play a
much smaller role in the pre-shock phase. The
fact that prices in the NH adjust much more
quickly to the equilibrium in the pre-shock
phase than in the post-shock phase (see Figure
1) is consistent with this argument. Therefore, if
we just reversed the sequence of the money
supply, we would probably observe that adjust-
ment is indeed quicker after the positive shock.
Yet, this increase in the adjustment speed would
not count as evidence for our explanation of the
stickier expectations in the NH.
What is, therefore, needed, is an experi-
mental design in which the number of domi-
nated strategies is roughly the same after the
negative and after the positive shock. Our
parameterization of the design with the posi-
tive shock serves this purpose. Except for
three aspects, all experimental details in the
positive-shock design are identical to the
negative-shock design. In particular, all five
features of the payoff functions, as described
in Section II, subsection B, are also present in
the positive-shock design. The differences are
the following: (i) We did not implement com-
puterized players in the positive-shock design
because the main purpose of this design was
to observe whether the expectations of human
players and, hence, also prices adjust more
quickly to the equilibrium after a positive
shock compared to the negative shock. (ii) In
the positive-shock design the pre- and the
post-shock phase consisted of 15 instead of
20 periods. This shortening of the phases was
implemented because in the negative-shock
design reliable equilibration was already
achieved after 10 –15 periods. (iii) To achieve
roughly the same number of dominated strat-
egies in the post-shock phase, equilibrium
prices for x- and y-types in the positive-shock
design were as follows: The pre-shock equi-
librium price for x-types (y-types) is P*x 5 11
(P*y 5 14) and the post-shock equilibrium
price is P*x 5 22 (P*y 5 28). As a conse-
quence, the average pre-shock equilibrium
price in a group is P# *0 5 12.5 while in the
post-shock equilibrium it is P# *1 5 25. Thus,
the difference in average prices between pre-
and post-shock equilibrium is 12.5 in the positive-
shock design while it is 12 in the negative-shock
design. This slightly bigger adjustment require-
ment in the positive-shock design is, however,
not a problem. If adjustment to equilibrium in
the NH is faster after the positive shock, this is
even more remarkable because it occurs despite
the slightly bigger adjustment requirement in
the positive-shock design.
B. Prices and Expectations after the Positive
Nominal Shock
Table 5 shows the evolution of pre- and
post-shock average prices in the RH and the
NH. In the NH pre-shock prices converge
from above to the equilibrium P# *0 5 12.5 and
as in the negative-shock design the vast ma-
TABLE 5—EVOLUTION OF PRICES AND EFFICIENCY LOSSES













215 13.0 14.9 14.7 26.3
214 13.0 14.7 18.2 24.7
213 12.7 14.6 10.7 20.7
212 12.7 14.3 5.3 13.6
211 12.7 14.3 6.1 20.5
210 12.5 14.1 1.6 9.1
29 12.5 13.6 2.1 10.9
28 12.5 13.4 0.3 11.3
27 12.4 13.7 1.2 14.8
26 12.5 13.8 0.6 13.2
25 12.5 13.8 1.6 8.4
24 12.5 13.9 0.3 10.4
23 12.5 13.6 0.9 7.0
22 12.6 13.1 4.7 6.9
21 12.5 13.1 1.9 1.0
1 22.5 20.5 22.3 24.0
2 24.3 22.8 3.9 7.2
3 24.8 24.1 1.2 4.2
4 24.9 24.8 0.7 1.4
5 25.0 25.0 0.2 0.9
6 25.0 25.1 0.1 0.3
7 25.0 25.2 0.1 0.4
8 25.0 25.1 0.1 0.1
9 25.0 25.0 0.1 0.1
10 25.0 25.2 0.1 0.3
11 25.0 25.2 0.2 0.1
12 25.0 25.0 0.1 0.1
13 25.0 25.0 0.1 0.1
14 24.3 24.5 6.3 5.9
15 24.6 24.9 4.0 1.4
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jority of individuals plays exactly the equilib-
rium in the final pre-shock period. Then, in
the first post-shock period prices make a big
jump upwards to 20.5 and already in period 4
after the shock, average prices are almost
exactly at the new equilibrium of P# * 5 25.
From that period onwards prices remain very
close to the equilibrium. This contrasts
sharply with the adjustment process after the
negative shock where, throughout the whole
post-shock period, average prices never came
so close to the equilibrium. This difference in
NH adjustment paths after the negative and
the positive shock is depicted in Figure 3. The
heavy line in Figure 3 shows the difference in
the post-shock deviations of average prices
from the equilibrium between the positive and
the negative shock.16 The graph reveals to
what extent in the NH the adjustment gap,
i.e., the deviation of average prices from the
equilibrium, is larger after the negative shock
than after the positive shock. It shows that the
deviation from equilibrium is substantially
larger after the negative shock. Between pe-
riod 2 and 7, e.g., the adjustment gap is four
or more units bigger after the negative shock.
Even in period 10 the adjustment gap is still
almost three units bigger.
The impression conveyed by Figure 3 is con-
firmed by a more formal statistical analysis. If
we perform regression (3) with the data after the
positive shock, it turns out that in the NH the
16 Let P# *11 be the post-shock equilibrium price in the
positive-shock design and let P# 1 be the actual post-shock
average price. Analogously, let P# 2 be the actual post-shock
average price in the negative-shock design and denote the
post-shock equilibrium price in this design by P# *12. Then
the heavy line in Figure 3 is given by (P# 2 2 P# *12) 2
(P# *11 2 P# 1), which measures the difference in the average
deviations from equilibrium across the positive and the
negative shock for the first 15 periods of the post-shock
phase in the NH.
FIGURE 3. DIFFERENCES IN DEVIATIONS FROM EQUILIBRIUM ACROSS THE NEGATIVE AND THE POSITIVE SHOCK
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hypothesis of equilibrium play can only be re-
jected for the first three periods (at the 5-percent
level). Remember that after the negative shock,
group prices were significantly above the equi-
librium for 12 periods. Thus, the evidence un-
ambiguously indicates that adjustment in the
NH is much quicker after the positive shock,
which is consistent with our hypothesis that
there is less reluctance against adjustment after
the positive shock.
If there is indeed less reluctance against ad-
justment after the positive shock, at least some
subjects should anticipate this. Therefore we
should also observe that expectations are less
sticky after the positive shock. The dashed
heavy line in Figure 3 shows the difference in
the post-shock deviations of the average expec-
tations of P# 2i from the equilibrium between the
positive and the negative shock. This graph is
constructed analogously to the heavy line in
Figure 3 except that we used the expectations
P# 2ie to construct it. Thus the dashed heavy line
shows to what extent the adjustment gap in the
expectations, i.e., the deviation of average ex-
pectations from equilibrium, is larger after the
negative shock than after the positive one. The
graph indicates that the adjustment gap in the
expectations is much larger after the negative
shock for many time periods. Interestingly, the
graph is hump-shaped, i.e., the relative sticki-
ness of expectations after the negative shock
increases in the first few periods. This is due to
the fact that between period 2 and 5 after the
positive shock, expectations rapidly converge to
equilibrium while they are very sticky after the
negative shock.
Finally, since the rule of thumb of taking
nominal payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs
cannot be operative in the RH, we should
observe no differences in price adjustment in
the RH across negative and positive shocks.
Table 5 shows the evolution of average prices
in the RH after the positive shock and Figure
3 illustrates the differences in average prices
and average expectations across shocks. Ta-
ble 5 indicates that in the pre-shock phase of
the RH the average price is very close to the
equilibrium P# *0 5 12.5 already after three
periods. Immediately after the positive shock
there is a big upward jump in prices to 22.5,
only 2.5 units below the new equilibrium.
Already in the third post-shock period the
average price is again very close to the equi-
librium. This indicates that price adjustment
after the positive shock is rather quick in the
RH—similar to the pattern after the negative
shock. This similarity is also displayed in
Figure 3 and by formal statistical analysis.
The thin line in Figure 3 is constructed anal-
ogously to the heavy line except that we use
the price data from the RH. It shows that price
adjustment in the RH is only slightly faster
after the positive shock. If we perform regres-
sion (3) with the post-shock data from the
positive-shock design we get the following
results: The hypothesis that average prices in
the RH are in equilibrium can only be rejected
for the first two periods (at the 5-percent
level). Note that this is exactly the same num-
ber of out-of-equilibrium periods as after the
negative shock. This suggests that the differ-
ences in the price adjustment across shocks in
the RH are indeed negligible. The dashed thin
line in Figure 3, which is constructed analo-
gously to the dashed heavy line except that
we use the expectations data from the RH,
indicates that we can basically make a similar
conclusion with regard to the differences in
the adjustment of expectations across shocks.
While in the NH there are large differences in
the stickiness of expectations across shocks,
in the RH the differences in expectations are
rather small.
Thus all major regularities are consistent
with our hypothesis that there are beliefs that
some subjects take nominal payoffs as a
proxy for real payoffs. Nonetheless, it would
be reassuring if subjects themselves ex-
pressed such a belief. To check to what extent
subjects indeed believed this they could indi-
cate their degree of agreement with the fol-
lowing statement after the experiment: “I
believed that the other subjects would inter-
pret high nominal payoffs as an indicator for
high real payoffs.” Participants could indicate
whether they weakly (dis)agreed, whether
they strongly (dis)agreed or whether they to-
tally (dis)agreed with this statement. Thirty
percent of the subjects in the NH agreed ei-
ther “strongly” or “totally” and further 25
percent indicated a weak agreement. In our
view, this can be taken as direct evidence that
a majority of the subjects believed that other
subjects were affected by money illusion. In
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any case, these answers nicely fit with our
explanation for the large amount of nominal iner-
tia observed in the NH after the negative shock.
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Most economic transactions are represented
in nominal terms. Therefore, it seems likely that
people often perceive and think about economic
problems in nominal terms which may induce
money illusion. However, for several decades
money illusion has been considered as largely
irrelevant for the nominal inertia of aggregate
price levels. Instead, most economists have fo-
cused on informational frictions, costs of price
adjustment, and staggered contracts. This paper
shows, however, that even in the absence of
these factors a fully anticipated negative nomi-
nal shock can cause long-lasting nominal inertia
that is associated with large real income losses
during the adjustment phase. Our results indi-
cate that a large part of this nominal inertia can
be attributed to the direct and indirect effects of
money illusion. The experiments in the setting
with computerized opponents show that the di-
rect effects of money illusion in the form of
individual optimization mistakes are not very
frequent: The introduction of the nominal frame
in the setting with computerized opponents
causes only a small amount of nominal inertia.
However, the combined direct and indirect ef-
fects of money illusion generate a very large
increase in nominal inertia. This is indicated by
the fact that the introduction of the nominal
frame in the setting with human opponents
causes a huge increase in the sluggishness of
prices. Instead of two it takes 12 periods until
average prices reach the post-shock equilibrium
in this setting.
The major cause for nominal inertia after the
negative shock is that subjects’ expectations are
very sticky. In our view this stickiness of price
expectations is related to the nature of money
illusion in our experiment, i.e., to the belief that
there are subjects who take nominal payoffs as
a proxy for real payoffs. This conjecture is
supported by direct questionnaire evidence and
by the results of further experiments with a fully
anticipated positive nominal shock. It turns out
that price sluggishness is much smaller after a
positive nominal shock than after the negative
shock. This result is also interesting insofar as
there is field evidence indicating that positive
and negative money shocks have asymmetric
effects. While negative shocks have an output-
reducing effect, positive shocks do not seem to
affect output (James Peery Cover, 1992; J.
Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers,
1988). The asymmetric effects of money illu-
sion on price sluggishness can be considered as
a potential microfoundation for this result.
Finally, another interesting result of our ex-
periments is that we isolate—in addition to
money illusion—a further source of nominal
inertia. This source is related to the fact that in
a strategic situation subjects do not merely face
an individual optimization problem but that
they also have to predict other agents’ behavior.
After any shock, the new equilibrium can only
be achieved if subjects have coordinated (equi-
librium) expectations. The comparison of ad-
justment paths in the real treatments with
computerized and with human opponents shows
that after a fully anticipated nominal shock, it
cannot be taken for granted that subjects instan-
taneously succeed in solving this coordination
problem. They will, in general, go through a
period of disequilibrium that is associated with
nominal inertia. Note, however, that the coordi-
nation problem alone causes substantially less
nominal inertia than money illusion. It also does
not cause asymmetric effects: In the real treat-
ment with human opponents the extent of nom-
inal inertia is very similar after the positive and
the negative nominal shock.
These results show that experiments can be a
useful tool for the examination of the nature, the
extent, and the impact of money illusion in
strategic economic interactions. There are many
other questions that could be usefully tackled by
experimental methods. One open question is
how subjects who are familiar with money
shocks in our pricing game will respond to new
shocks. Future research should thus examine
how the adjustment pattern varies when expe-
rienced subjects face a series of different
shocks. Other interesting questions concern the
nature of nominal wage rigidity and the inter-
action of price and wage policies during adjust-
ment. To answer these questions it is necessary
to introduce workers as separate players in the
game. The analysis of the interaction between
wage and price setting may prove particularly
useful because there are likely to be strong
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natural complementarities. For example, if
firms anticipate that workers will resist wage
cuts after a negative money shock they will
probably be reluctant to cut prices because
this would reduce their profits. Yet, if prices
stay high, workers may feel justified in resist-
ing wage cuts. Thus, the reluctance to cut
wages and prices could be mutually reinforc-
ing for an extended period of time. Finally,
another interesting question concerns how the
impact of money illusion varies with the de-
gree of strategic complementarity. Is a lower
degree of complementarity associated with
less aggregate nominal inertia or not? Or,
more fundamentally, does the impact of
money illusion vanish in an environment with
strategic substitutability?
In our view the results of our experiments
indicate that money illusion should be con-
sidered as a serious candidate in the explana-
tion of nominal inertia and the real effects of
nominal shocks. Paraphrasing Abraham Lin-
coln,17 one can say that, to render money
illusion behaviorally relevant, it is not neces-
sary to fool all the people some of the time,
not to speak of fooling all the people all the
time. All that is needed is an environment
with strategic complementarity and the pres-
ence of a small amount of money illusion at
the individual level—a presupposition that
seems quite plausible.
APPENDIX: PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
As explained in detail in Section II, subsec-
tions B and C, payoffs were presented to subjects
in payoff tables. These tables were calculated
from the payoff functions explained below. A full
set of payoff tables is contained in Fehr and
Tyran (2000) which can be downloaded from
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp045.pdf. The
payoff tables are also available from the authors
upon request.
The real payoff for agent i of type k 5 x, y
is given by:
p ik 5
V z F1 1 a z D21 1 b z D2G
1 1 c z FSPikM 2 P*kM D 2 d z D 1 e z arctan~ f z D!G
2 .
P# 2ik is the actual average price of the other
n 2 1 players from the viewpoint of player i
who is of type k. P# *k is the equilibrium average
price of the other n 2 1 players from the
viewpoint of a player of type k. Pik is the actual
price of i who is of type k. P*k is the equilib-
rium price of a player of type k. Finally,
D 5 (P# 2ik/M) 2 (P# *k/M). The parameters for
M and all equilibrium values can be found in
Table 2.
In all periods and all experimental sessions
the parameters a, b, c, d, e, f, and V were the
same. They were given by a 5 0.5, b 5 0.6,
c 5 27, d 5 1, e 5 0.05, f 5 20 and V 5 40.
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